

# **Now Hiring: The Impact of Recruitment Strategies on the Hiring of City Managers**

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## **Abstract**

Scholars have examined the causes of city manager turnover and seem to agree that city manager turnover can significantly impact local governance outcomes (Feiock and Stream 2002, Watson and Hassett 2003, Feiock and Stream 1998, McCabe et al. 2008). While it isn't clear whether turnover systematically leads to positive or negative outcomes, scholars generally agree that turnover among city managers is frequent (Ammons and Bosse 2005). After one manager leaves a municipality, what factors might attract potential city managers to apply for the position? In this paper, we examine the impact of municipal condition, community desirability, and economic incentives on the recruitment of city managers to open positions. Municipalities often advertise community desirability, municipal conditions and economic incentives, but which of these factors are significantly associated with the number and quality of city managers that apply for a given open position? We collect the advertisements used to recruit city managers in the state of Florida and analyze those advertisements to test for associations between features of the recruitment strategy and the number of people who applied for each position.

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NOTE: This is a relatively new project, and sadly, data collection has been more difficult than imagined and was not completed in time for the conference. This draft includes the theoretical underpinnings and hypotheses of the project as well as a description of the data collection process. We have provided summary statistics for the data we have on hand. These summary statistics are preliminary in nature and should be considered as such. Further, we would appreciate any feedback on how to address the unanticipated data collection challenges.

## **Introduction**

A central challenge facing government organizations is the recruitment and retention of knowledge workers. A knowledge worker is an individual “who knows more about his/her job than anyone else in the organization” (Drucker 1959, 18-19). Within the local government context, city managers are key knowledge workers; their skill and performance is central to successful local government outcomes. City managers typically oversee all city departments, including finance, transportation, housing, economic development, planning, parks and recreation, and sometimes public safety. As such, city managers serve an instrumental role in local government administration and in the provision of local government services. When a city manager position is vacated, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the municipality must recruit and hire a new city manager. The council’s selection of a new city manager can have a significant impact on municipal operations and outcomes for years to come. But what factors attract potential city managers to apply for an open position? Effectively recruiting quality candidates for a city manager position can minimize the time that this key local government job goes unfilled (often requiring an interim city manager) and can place the local government on a positive or negative trajectory for years to come.

Despite acknowledging the importance of recruiting and retaining knowledge workers (Marlowe and Nalbandian, 2005), little work in public management has empirically examined how public sector organizations, specifically local governments, can best recruit senior managers. City managers are often ambitious professionals seeking career advancement in their field, and turnover is frequent, with the average manager serving 3 to 7 years per position (Feiock and Stream 1998, ICMA 2006). When considering an open position, ambitious city managers must consider their ability to perform as an agent of the council in that particular city,

as their likelihood of meeting council expectations in one city might impact their future career prospects in other municipalities. City managers serve at the will of the council, meaning that the risk or difficulty associated with the job and the likelihood of termination impacts a manager's assessment of the overall desirability of a given job. If a municipality is in poor fiscal, economic, and/or political condition, the job may be seen as less desirable and attract fewer applicants. However, the overall risk associated with the job (a function of municipal conditions) is not the only factor that may impact the number of applicants for an open city manager position. Recent work by management scholars suggests that knowledge workers are attracted to compensation, quality of work, and community factors (Baron and Hanna, 2002).

Little scholarly work has examined the recruitment of city managers to better understand the factors that impact the recruitment and hiring of these key local government knowledge workers. In this project, we seek to examine two research questions: What factors impact the total number of applicants for a city manager position? And what factors impact the overall quality of applicants for a city manager position? Given the impending retirement of baby boomers from the field of city management, and the frequent turnover of city managers, it is important for scholars and practitioners alike to understand what factors attract city managers to apply for open positions and how municipalities can best recruit quality city managers.

We seek to analyze council-manager municipalities in Florida that have recently conducted an open search for a new city manager to empirically examine the impact of municipal condition (including economic, fiscal, and political factors), community desirability, and economic incentives on the recruitment of city managers. Specifically, we examine the published advertisements for open city manager positions in conjunction with data on municipal conditions. Finally, we collect the resume of each applicant for each open city manager position

to assess the number and quality of applicants. Preliminary results suggest that municipalities spend significant sums on recruitment and often advertise community desirability to potential city manager candidates. Once more data is collected, we plan to analyze the impact of advertised community features on the number of applicants for a given position. Finally, we seek to conduct an analysis of the applicant resumes for each open city manager position to assess the overall quality of the applicant pool.

By examining the impact of municipal conditions and local government recruitment efforts on the number and quality of applicants for an open city manager position, this research project contributes to the field of public management by allowing scholars and practitioners alike to identify the characteristics of an effective and efficient city manager recruitment strategy. The results of this empirical analysis will offer tangible suggestions for how municipal governments seeking to hire a new city manager can attract a quality pool of applicants and a large enough pool of applicants to allow for targeted selection of a city manager who is a good fit for the organization. The implications of the research project are far reaching as the city manager plays an integral role in the provision of local government services and the trajectory of local government outcomes.

The article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the municipal and economic factors that may serve to attract city manager candidates to a given position. Next, we outline several hypotheses with regard to the relationship between municipal factors and city manager recruitment. We then describe the collection of Florida municipal recruitment information to examine the impact of municipal level factors, including quality of life considerations, economic incentives, and municipal conditions, on the number of applicants for an open city manager position. We conclude with a discussion of the preliminary summary statistics, and the

limitations of the research, specifically difficulties with data collection and possible avenues for further analysis.

### **City Manager Turnover and Recruitment**

The recruitment of a talented and high quality workforce is a high priority for many public sector organizations, including local governments (Center for State and Local Government Excellence 2014). In the wake of the 2008 recession, the rate of city manager retirements has increased and members of the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) have expressed concerns about demand for city managers outpacing supply (Gabris, Davis, and Nelson 2010). While this may be due to a fundamental shift in the challenges of managing a municipality after the recession (Nakamura 2014), or because of the aging of the baby boom generation (Svara 2010), it is clear that the need for a systematic examination of how local governments can successfully recruit managers is becoming more critical.

Given that the city manager is the highest non-elected position within the municipal organization, career advancement within the profession requires mobility. Nearly 80 percent of city managers serve in a community different from the one in which they grew up or originally resided (DeSantis and Newell 1996). Studies estimate that average manager tenure is between 3.4 years per city (Feiock and Stream 1998) and 7.5 years per city (ICMA 2006). Historically, only 5 percent of city managers remain in a given position for more than 20 years (Watson and Hassett 2003). For city managers, “the average tenure in a given managerial post is brief by most professional standards” (Ammons and Bosse 2005, 61). Turnover among city managers is frequent because of the nature of the profession, and turnover has increased in the wake of the great recession. In California, for example, more than one-third of the council-manager cities in

the state underwent a change in management in the four-year period after peak of the recession in 2008.

The recruitment of a new city manager is not only a frequent occurrence for many cities, it is a consequential one as well. City managers play a central role in overseeing municipal operations, thus a local government's ability to effectively attract a number of quality city manager candidates is particularly important to the local government's future. Turnover from one manager to another may significantly disrupt governance and the relationships between senior public officials and key stakeholders in the community (Feldman and Khademian 2002), particularly because city managers play an integral role in negotiating interlocal and privately contracted service delivery (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991, Thurmaier and Wood 2002). As different managers bring different preferences, skills, and backgrounds to the job (McCabe et al. 2008, 381), successful recruitment depends on attracting a sizeable pool of applicants from which to choose and selecting a quality manager likely to meet council expectations.

While many scholars and practitioners alike would suggest that public servants, including city managers, are attracted to government work because of a sense of public service motivation (Perry 1997) or strong norms and emotions about performing public service (Brewer et al 2000), this only explains the choice to work in the public rather than private sector. It is likely that all city managers have some degree of innate public service motivation, for the creation of the council-manager form of government and the International City County Management Association are both founded on the principles of serving the public for the common good (Perry 1997). While public service motivation attracts workers to the public sector generally, why are some local governments better able to recruit and attract managers than

others? Why do some cities have hundred of applicants after turnover at the manager position while others have only a handful?

It is widely accepted that city councils seek to hire highly trained, professional managers on the basis of some combination of education, experience, skill and ability (ICMA 2006). Scholars have examined the characteristics councils desire in managers (Saltzstein 1974), city managers' attitudes toward affirmative action practices used during recruitment (Slack 1987), and the increasingly use of executive search firms by local governments (Ammons and Glass 1988). However, no systematic work has examined why some cities are better able to attract city manager candidates than others.

### **Economic Incentives**

It is generally accepted that compensation and employee benefits are integral to recruiting talented workers. Amongst US companies, compensation and pay-based incentives are the most popular recruitment and retention mechanisms (Cappelli 2000). While the public sector often cannot match the compensation packages of comparable private sector jobs, municipal governments can and do compete against one another in the compensation they offer managers.

Public sector human resource managers cite compensation, healthcare, and retirement plans as some of the most important tools to recruit and retain workers at all levels of government (Kellar 2014). McEwan (1999) suggests that economic incentives, specifically salary increases, retirement benefits, and limited duration incentives, such as relocation assistance, bolster an organization's ability to attract public sector workers. Economic or financial incentives are a particularly useful tool in recruiting public sector workers in rural or hard-to-staff areas (Kolbe and Stunk 2012) as they may counterbalance some of the perceived

disadvantages of working in a small, rural local governments, such as lack of spousal opportunities, lack of cultural attractions, and potential isolation from friends and family (McEwan 1999).

Considering the importance of compensation and economic incentives in the recruitment of workers in all sectors, we predict that as the economic incentives associated with an open position increase, the number of city manager candidates attracted to the position will increase.

*H<sub>1</sub>: As the perceived economic incentives of a position increase, the number of applicants for the position increases.*

### **Community Desirability**

Aside from financial incentives, the livability or general “desirability” of the community may impact recruitment success. School quality is a key indicator of an overall desirable place to live as “good schools usually come bundled with other neighborhood qualities such as proximity to employment, shopping and recreational conveniences, and neighborhood peers” (Kane, Reigg and Staiger 2006, 1). Additionally, school quality may play an important role in recruitment as it contributes non-monetary value to the compensation of the manager as a key determinant of housing prices (Kane, Staiger and Samms 2003).

In addition to serving as a general indicator of a desirable places to live, school quality also directly affects managers with children. Most managers are under pressure (if not explicitly required in their contracts) to live within the limits of the municipality, meaning their children will either attend the local public schools in that municipality or the manager will pay the cost of sending the children to private school. The presence of high quality schools in the municipality



in which the manager will work adds value to the compensation package and can be thought of as an asset by the manager with school-age children.

Several additional aspects of community desirability are associated with the attraction of workers. Economists have found that the U.S. population is increasingly migrating to places with high perceived quality of life (Rappaport 2009). Generally, households are attracted to an area's traits such as proximity to the ocean, cultural opportunities, the availability of recreational activities (Carlino and Saiz 2008), consumer amenities, and land rents or property values (Chen and Rosenthal 2008). Scholars suggest that, generally, households prefer to move to communities in warm, coastal areas and non-metropolitan areas (Chen and Rosenthal 2008). Household relocation to areas with warm climates cannot be primarily explained by shifting industrial composition or retirees, but rather is a more general American phenomenon (Rappaport 2006) as coastal locations are increasingly associated with high perceived quality of life (Rappaport 2009).

In addition to migration toward coastal and warm-weather communities, workers are often attracted to consumer amenities such as restaurants and live performance venues, particularly as educational attainment and income increases. (Chen and Rosenthal 2008, Glaeser et al. 2001). This is especially true for workers nearing retirement who increasingly demand consumer amenities in conjunction with their increasing wealth (Rappaport 2009). Communities wishing to attract more workers and residents are particularly apt to focus on consumer amenities, for while manufacturing nice weather or a nearby beach may not be possible, these communities can attempt to attract residents with a wide array of civic amenities like schools, public safety, parks, museums, sports teams, festivals, and more (Rappaport 2009).

Given the role of community desirability in attracting workers, particularly those nearing retirement, to move to new communities, we predict that the more desirable the community in which the municipality is located, the more city manager candidates will be attracted to the position.

*H<sub>2</sub>: As perceived community desirability increases, the number of applicants increases.*

### **Municipal Condition**

While community desirability is of importance to a wide array of workers, the condition of the municipal government, as the place of employment, is particularly important to city manager candidates considering applying for an open position. The condition of the municipality (financially, politically, and organizationally) directly contributes to the difficulty of the job the manager will face. As an agent of the council, who serves at will and can typically be fired with a simple majority vote, the city manager is acutely aware of the need to meet council expectations. Managers play a key role in shaping and carrying out budget policy, thus the economic and financial condition of the city is a key contributor to the difficulty of the job the manager will face.

In addition to fiscal conditions, political conditions may make a municipality more or less desirable as a potential workplace, particularly if council politics are tumultuous or council turnover is frequent. The city manager is hired and fired by the council, and thus any change in council makeup presents a risk to the manager. Given the nature of the principal-agent relationship between the council and the manager, and the electoral pressure placed on city councilors, the city manager is never completely insulated from political concerns or debates.

Empirical research has suggested that city managers are integral to municipal policy-making and rarely immune to political pressure (Nalbandian 1999, 2000; Svava 1990, 1998). City managers are always one city council vote away from employment termination. Newly elected council members may seek to implement change in the municipality by replacing the acting city manager. In personal interviews with city managers and public sector executive recruiters, concern over political turmoil as a threat to career success was common (Roberts 2013). Prior work has shown that managers taking jobs in cities with more political turmoil have a higher degree of employment protection (specifically severance and protection from termination before or after elections) in their employment contracts (Connolly 2016).

*H<sub>3</sub>: As turnover on the council becomes more likely, the number of applicants for the city manager position decreases.*

### **Organizational Factors**

Finally, organizational factors may serve to attract city manager candidates. The typical city manager is responsible for overseeing and directing the administrative operations of the municipality, including the provision of services. As a part of this responsibility, one of the manager's duties is to recruit, hire, terminate, and generally supervise government staff. The city manager also plays an integral role in the budgetary process, typically preparing the municipal budget for council consideration. After the council passes the annual budget, the manager is responsible for monitoring and implementing the city budget. The manager's role is particularly important given that most city council members are members of the community serving in part time positions, often without any education or experience in financial management.

It is not clear whether city managers, as a group, are attracted to positions with larger organizations with more full time employees and larger budgets. These larger organizations could serve to attract more applicants or to deter applicants. On the one hand, serving as the manager of a municipality with a larger population, a larger number of employees, or a larger budget presents a chance for the manager to improve his professional reputation and further advance his career. On the other hand, larger organizations and larger budgets may present challenges to the manager as they create more complex environments. For example, many smaller cities with few full time employees contract out the provision of the majority of their services, making the task of overseeing the provision of services much simpler than in a city in which all services are provided in house. Given the frequent turnover among managers and the need for professional advancement, we predict that as organizational size increases, more managers will be attracted to the open city manager position.

*H<sub>4</sub>: As organizational size increases, the number of applicants for the city manager position increases.*

*H<sub>5</sub>: As organizational resources increase, the number of applicants for the city manager position increases.*

## **Data**

We seek to create a unique dataset with pooled cross sectional data on municipalities in Florida that recruited for a new city manager in 2012, 2013, or 2014. The dataset includes cities of all population sizes, operating under the council manager form of government. The data on

each municipality was collected using the Florida League of Cities CityStat databank, which includes annual information on each municipality in the state of Florida, and through public records requests to each municipality in Florida to gather information on the applicants for their last city manager search.

The unit of analysis is the municipality, and the dataset includes information on the number of applicants for each open city manager position, the salary paid to the previous manager in his final year of employment with the municipality, the school rankings in the municipality, whether the municipality is a coastal community, and key measures of the municipality including the general fund budget in the year prior to the position being advertised, the number of full time police officers working in the city, and the number of full time employees working for the city. The dataset also includes information gathered from the advertisements used to recruit city manager candidates to apply for open positions, including advertised salary ranges and advertised organizational characteristics.

The key dependent variable of this study is *number of candidates*, a continuous measure of the total number of people who applied to each open city manager position. While this measure only accounts for quantity and not quality, it does give an overall indication of the degree to which external city manager candidates view the city manager position as desirable. The number of candidates per open city manager position ranges from 3 to 141 with an average of approximately 38 candidates. While we plan to create a recruitment index in the future that includes measures of both the quantity of applicants and the quality of applicants, at this time in the data collection process, only the quantity of applicants is available. It is important to note that municipalities that reported only one city manager candidate were excluded from the study as it was unclear whether they only had one applicant or if they chose to hire an internal candidate

and did not recruit external applications. While some of these cities may have conducted an external search and received only one application, we could not determine which of these two scenarios applied to each city with only one applicant given the collected data. Though we do not have evidence of such a scenario, it is also possible that some of the cities may have had more than one applicant but did not keep appropriate records.

There are several key independent variables in the study that measure economic incentives, community desirability, and municipal condition. The key measure of the perceived economic incentives tied to the job is *previous manager salary*, a continuous variable which measures the annual compensation in thousands of dollars paid to the previous manager in her last year of employment (the year before the manager position was announced as open). The previous manager salary has a mean of \$137,240 with wide variation between \$71,000 and \$255,000. While numerous other economic incentives may be offered to the incoming manager, annual compensation is one of the most important and largest components of the compensation package and a salary paid to the previous manager is a signal of the acceptable rate of compensation for the manager position in the community. Further, the information on the salary paid the previous manager is easily accessible as public record, meaning that it is information available to all applicants for the open city manager position if they choose to request it. While retirement benefits are also a key component of the overall compensation package, the complexity of retirement packages offered city managers makes them more difficult to directly compare from city to city, although this information is currently being collected for use in future iterations of this study.

Several independent variables are included to measure the desirability of the community. First, we include the variable *school rank*, a continuous measure of the ranking of the overall

quality of the municipality's schools out of all other municipalities in Florida. This ranking was out of 400 school rankings for the state of Florida. Among the municipalities included in the sample, school rank ranges from 15 to 400. Second, we include the variable *coastal*, a dichotomous measure coded as a "1" if the municipality's city or town hall is located within 5 miles of shoreline and a "0" if otherwise. Interestingly, according to this measure, 62% of the municipalities for which we have full data qualify as "coastal." This suggests that perhaps another measure of desirability would be useful. However, while warm weather climates have been shown to be a particular draw for workers, there is not enough variation in the climates of Florida cities to include measure of climate. We also include a measure for the *walkscore of city hall* as a general measure of the walkability of the community. While different neighborhoods of a city have different degrees of walkability, since we cannot know which neighborhood the new manager will live in, we chose to measure the walkability from the address of city hall as that would be the managers work location on a day-to-day basis. The average walkability of city hall is 49.81 out of 100, with a range of 0 to 96.

Finally, we include several measures of municipal condition in the model. The measure *term limits* is a dichotomous variable which is coded a "1" if the municipal charter includes term limits for city council members and a "0" if otherwise. This measure is particularly relevant with regard to the political environment as cities with term limits will by institutional design experience turnover at given intervals while cities without term limits may experience longer periods of consistent membership on the council. Approximately 44% of the cities included in this analysis have term limits for council members. We also include the measure *general fund per capita*, a continuous variable that measures the value of the municipality's general fund budget in the prior fiscal year on a per capita basis. This measure is an indicator of the relative

prosperity of the municipality and its financial resources. As such, there is significant variation in this measure; the average general fund budget per capita is \$1,043 with a low of \$835 and a high of \$1,459. In order to approximate the relative size of the municipal organization which the manager will oversee, we include the measure *full time employees*, a continuous variable which represents the total number of full time employees employed by the municipality in the year prior to the open city manager position being announced. The average number of full time employees is approximately 355, with a low of 25 and a high of 1715.

From the advertisements used to recruit city manager candidates, we coded several key characteristics. First, we include a measure of the advertised salary. As most advertisements include a salary range, we code for both the *advertised low salary* (in thousands of dollars) and the *advertised high salary* (in thousands of dollars). If an advertisement only includes one salary, we use that value for both the low and high salary variables. Interestingly, the average advertised high salary (approximately \$131,000) is less than the average salary of the previous city manager (\$137,000). This could be the result of cities seeking to reduce expenses in the wake of the recession, but this anomaly warrants further examination. We also include the *advertised number of full time employees in the municipal organization* (a continuous measure that can take on a value of 0 if the city is a contract city that has no full time employees other than the manager) and the *advertised municipal budget* (in thousands of dollars).

This data has been fully collected for 43 cities thus far (summary statistics provided in Table 1). While data on the number of applicants has been collected on more than 70 cities, numerous cities had to be excluded because of incomplete data or due to having only one applicant for the open city manager position. While this resulted in a much smaller sample size than desirable for this draft of the paper, data collection is ongoing, and we aim for a larger



sample size in the future. However, one significant concern with data collection is the frequent occurrence of a municipalities responding to a public records request for this information by reporting that they no longer have records of the recruitment process or that a third party public sector executive recruiter has the files, not the city itself. These data collection hurdles have proved more challenging than anticipated, and have significantly limited our ability to collect enough data to make any generalizations. We have included summary statistics and a discussion of the data collection process for the purpose of receiving feedback.

## **Conclusion**

There is growing recognition among scholars and practitioners of the need to examine the ways in which local government can recruit city managers, particularly given the recent and impending wave of city manager retirements (Svara 2010). While data collection challenges prevent a full analysis of the key research questions at hand, a preliminary examination of the currently available data does suggest that there is a great deal of variation in the terms of the job included in the job advertisement. At the least, further data collection and analysis is warranted to fully examine empirically test our hypotheses regarding the factors that impact the recruitment of city manager candidates. f

However, a new approach to data collection or the measurement of some key concepts may be required. First, the sample only includes cities that searched for a new city manager in 2012, 2013, and 2014. While we have information on the number of candidates for the last open city manager position for nearly 70 (and counting) municipalities in Florida, many of these city manager searches took place prior to 2012, for which the Florida League of Cities does not have data on the previous city manager's salary, the number of full time employees, or the general

fund budget. While it is possible this data could be collected with additional public records requests to each municipality in the sample, this collection will require more time.

Additionally, some measures could be improved with further data collection. In terms of economic incentives, we are planning to collect information on the retirement packages, relocation benefits, and in-kind transfers such as car allowances provided to the city manager by each city. With regard to community desirability, a reimagined approach to the community factors that city managers and their spouses and families may view as desirable is warranted. Economic research suggests that as educational attainment and income increase, attraction to consumer amenities like restaurants and cultural attractions increases (Rappaport 2009) and most city managers, the majority of whom make six-figure salaries and have graduate educations, would certainly fall into this category.

Finally, with regard to municipal political condition, a more nuanced measure of political turmoil should be explored. While term limits do pose a risk to managers by requiring periodic turnover on the council, other factors, such as the competitiveness of elections and the margin of council votes could also pose career risk to managers and create an undesirable work environment.

One of the key data collection efforts of this project is the collection and coding of the advertisements used by municipalities to recruit new city managers. Upon deeper inspection, we have found that many cities in the state of Florida use public sector executive recruiting firms to attract and filter candidates for open city manager positions. The advertisements crafted by these recruiting firms often include color pictures of coastline and community attractions along with lengthy narratives about the positive qualities and livability of the community. However, one of the unanticipated challenges of data collection is that the ads largely look the same although

some of the key terms (salary, city size, etc.) are different. The similarity in the ads results from more than half of the ads collected thus far having been created by the same public sector executive recruiting firm that appears to use a template to create a very similar looking ad for each city. This calls into question the role of advertisements in the recruitment process. It is possible that cities that use the multi-page color ads have a recruiting advantage compared to the cities that use simply one-page black and white newspaper style advertisements, but since all the cities with the multi-page color advertisements have retained the same recruiting firm, it is unclear whether it is the advertisement or the recruiting firm's other methods that attract candidates to apply for the open position. The use of a public sector executive recruiting firm to conduct a city manager search can cost anywhere between \$10,000 to \$30,000 on average, an expense that warrants further investigation.

Another potential avenue to gather data that would allow us to empirically test our hypotheses is to conduct a survey of city managers. While we originally sought to use the features of the advertisements and of the municipality itself to predict the number of applicants to an open city manager position, a survey that could better measure what factors managers themselves rate as important when considering whether to apply for an open position may prove illuminating.

**Table 1. Summary Statistics**

| Variable                            | Mean     | Std. Dev. | Min.   | Max.   |
|-------------------------------------|----------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Number of Candidates                | 37.58    | 36.31     | 3      | 141    |
| Term Limits (1=year)                | 0.44     | 0.51      | 0      | 1      |
| Previous Manager Salary (thousands) | 137.24   | 46.97     | 71.00  | 255.00 |
| Full Time Employees                 | 355      | 431.28    | 25     | 1715   |
| Genera Fund Budget Per Capita       | 1043.31  | 197.47    | 835.64 | 1459.2 |
| School Rank (out of 400)            | 181.85   | 106.28    | 15     | 400    |
| Coastal (1=yes)                     | 0.62     | 0.50      | 0      | 1      |
| Walkscore (city hall)               | 49.81    | 22.50     | 0      | 96     |
| Ad Low Salary (thousands)           | 103.76   | 34.68     | 45     | 175    |
| Ad High Salary (thousands)          | 131.39   | 48.64     | 47     | 240    |
| Ad Budget (thousands)               | 51393.62 | 78071.49  | 0      | 300000 |
| Ad FTE                              | 151.10   | 442.02    | 0      | 1900   |

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